Introduction
On the 25th November 2008 the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBoA) of the European Patent Office (EPO) ruled to reject a patent application, 1 made by the Wisconsin Research Alumni Fund (WARF) in which was claimed methods for the derivation of primate-including human-embryonic stem cells and the embryonic stem cells themselves as 'compositions of matter'. The EPO decision was grounded in the board of appeal's interpretation of Article 53 of the European Patent Convention which governs exclusions from patentability. Specifically, the EBoA considered that the WARF application was covered by Rule 28 (c) 2 of the Convention which states that the use of human embryos for 'industrial or commercial' purposes should be excluded from patentability as this would be contrary to public order and morality. 3 As the highest authority of the EPO, the EBoA's ruling appears to embody a final rejection of the granting of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in materials derived directly from human embryos and, as such, marks a significant divergence in patent policy between the EPO and the world's other major patent issuing bodies, notably the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO). In the USA the equivalent patent, issued by the USPTO (US patent 5, 843,780), making the same claims and based on the same work carried out by James Thompson and his team at the University of Wisconsin, was granted in 1998. Unlike European provisions, US patent law does not have a clause permitting moral exclusions from patentability. Instead, ethical issues relating to embryonic stem cells have been dealt with through legal provisions outside of patent law, such as the Bush administration prohibition on federally funded research on embryonic stem cell lines created after 9th August 2001. However, the WARF patent, often referred to as the '780 patent', and related follow-up patents, 4 have still been the subject of controversy in the US because of the perceived overly broad scope of their claims and the manner of their licensing (Rabin, 2005; Loring and Campbell, 2006; Bergman and Graff, 2007) . The case of the 'WARF patents' is illustrative of the multiple and complex ethical questions which attend the issue of IPRs in embryonic stem cell research (Plomer et al., 2008) . The aim of this article is 2-fold; firstly we intend to investigate the tensions surrounding human embryonic stem (hES) cells, exemplified by the WARF case, by placing them in the wider context of the role of IPRs in biotechnology. Stem cells, even considered as part of the broader field of regenerative medicine (Atala, 2007; Mason and Dunhil, 2008) , are a unique technology, posing specific technical, legal and ethical challenges. Of all stem cells, hES cells are the most ethically controversial because of the special moral and cultural significance attached to the human embryo. This moral concern attends not only to debates about the innate value of human life in the context of abortion, but also to the potential diminution of the status of the embryo from person to 'thing' through instrumental use or exchange (Cohen, 2001; Parry, 2006) . Nonetheless, stem cell technologies, and the endeavour to comprehend and commercialize them, are embedded in the established biotechnological model of innovation. Contemporary concerns about hES cells must be understood in this wider context, which shapes the debates, institutions, legal instruments, and systems of governance surrounding the commercial, academic and ethical value of hES cells. Secondly, in light of this contextualization, we will then give consideration as to how a balance between commercial exploitation, freedom of academic research and ethical requirements might be achieved in the intellectual property regimes of ES cell research.
Patenting and the new economy
A patent is a form of IPR which confers on the holder the right to prevent others from using or making a patented invention without prior permission from the patentee. The most important part of a patent is the list of claims, of which two broad types exist; product claims and process claims. Of these, the former are generally more powerful because they include a composition of material or invention itself, regardless of how it is made or obtained (Loring and Campbell, 2006) . In part, the moral basis for the granting of patents is to reward the industry of inventors by allowing them to profit from their discoveries-i.e. it acts as a retrospective reward for past actions (Resnik, 1997 (Resnik, , 2003 . In order to be eligible for the reward that patent protection confers, inventions must be suitably meritorious which, for most patent offices, means that an application must meet the criteria of novelty, non-obviousness and utility or industrial application. Additionally, the content of the patent (the new knowledge it represents), must be made publicly available through the publishing of the patent so that the rest of society can benefit from it. This forward-looking aspect represents the more common moral argument for this form of IPR and it is primarily a utilitarian one: that patents promote the socially-desirable outcome of the advancement of science and technology whether as ends in themselves or as means to other ends (Resnik, 1997) . The overall 'good' achieved by patenting law involves setting a balance between overcoming the tendency to under-invest in research and development activities and stimulating economic growth on the one hand, and promoting other desired ends such as the freedom of academic research and ensuring public benefit from new discoveries on the other (Cornish, 1993; Cornish et al., 2003) . The limiting of patent protection to a term of 20 years is one example of the attempt to balance these economic and public benefits, as are exemptions from patent liability for non-commercial (academic) research.
As the global economy moves away from traditional 'Fordist' models of production towards a more 'knowledge-based' economy where new technological information, as much as new material products, has become increasingly central to the economic success of states and corporations the importance of patents and other IPR's has dramatically increased (Cornish, 1993; Cooper, 2006; Kelli and Pisuke, 2008; Harvey, 2009) . As one of these novel technological enterprises, the establishment of biotechnology as a viable commercial venture is intrinsically linked to IPRs. The biotechnology model of innovation is based around the commercialization of discoveries arising from basic, often publicly-funded, research on the biology of living organisms (Harvey, 2009) . Patents, as a means of capturing and commodifying the otherwise intangible capital of new knowledge have a core role in both the economic strategies of states and in the business models of biotechnology entrepreneurs (Cornish, 1993; Waldby and Salter, 2008) . In the latter case, IPRs are a crucial means of giving small or medium-sized biotechnology companies some proprietary assets with which to attract speculative investment and to use as the basis for forging alliances during the long lead-time to eventual product development (Rothman and Kraft, 2006; Waldby and Salter, 2008) .
The process of biotechnological innovation relies upon the granting of patent rights to novel discoveries in the biosciences, causing, by accretion, the expansion of subject matter which is eligible for patent protection. One of the founding events of the modern biotechnology industry was the US Supreme Court case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty in 1980 where the court ruled in favour of allowing a patent on a genetically modified 'oil-eating' bacterium (Kevles, 2002; Brody, 2006a) . The significance of this ruling was that for the first time the USPTO was prepared to grant a patent not only on a process for modifying an organism but on that living organism itself (Rai and Eisenberg, 2003) . In Europe, where some states such as the UK had historically allowed patenting of living organisms (yeasts for example), a greater obstacle to biotechnological innovation was the varied and pluralistic IPR regimes of the European nations (Cornish et al., 2003; Jasanoff, 2005) . The 1973 European Patent Convention addressed the general issue of IP regimes for adherent states whereas the European Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions (98/44/EU) was implemented in 1998 to deal with the specific intellectual property aspects of biotechnology (Brody, 2007) . These developments can be understood in the context of a (re)positioning of the life sciences and the new knowledge they generate as a significant factor in the economic strategies of states and even supranational entities such as the European Union (Cornish, 1993; Cooper, 2006) .
Biotechnology and the ethics of patenting
With the emergence of biotechnology and the expansion of the scope of patent rights, has come increased public concern. From genes to genetically modified plants and animals, through to human cells, each stage of accretion of patentability in this arena has been contested (Brody, 2006a (Brody, , b, 2007 . Much of this opposition arises from cultural concerns about the moral appropriateness of property rights (primarily product claims) being applied to living, especially human-derived, matter (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2002; Cornish et al., 2003; Brody, 2007; Salter, 2007) . Historically, there has been a prohibition, at least in Western countries, in granting any form of property rights in the human body as being contrary to human dignity and the laws of many countries explicitly prohibit any form of commercial trade in bodies or body parts (Chadwick, 1997; Cohen, 1999) . This inevitably colours discussions on the commercial exploitation of material of human origin. Other recurring concerns include the consequences of overly restrictive or excessive pricing practices by patent holders on public health and academic research, and the potential exploitation of donors voluntarily giving biological material or information for commercially-directed research (Resnik, 1997; Andrews, 2002; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2002) . In essence much of the conflict over biotechnological patents can be understood in relation to fears that the expansion of patent protection to novel biological entities will upset the balance between the economic and public benefits of IP laws in favour of economic gain (especially where the advantage is seen to be gained by multinational corporations). 'Public benefit' is defined broadly here to include the preservation of common cultural values about the moral status of living entities and the desirability or otherwise of granting ownership over them. As Salter (2007, p. 301) ]. This allows legal room for the granting of patents on 'elements' such as genes and stem cells by making a distinction between the object in vivo and isolated components of the body obtained through human intervention using inventive processes. Similarly, US patent law allows for the patenting of 'forms' of matter not found in nature, although unlike European patent law it does not contain any specific clauses excluding entities from patentability on the grounds of morality. This does not mean that the US law has no means of formulating or considering moral aspects of patent law, but rather that ethically undesirable outcomes are dealt with by provisions outside the scope of patent law per se. In 2005 the US Patent and Trademark Office rejected Stuart Newman's 1997 claim, filed as a deliberate test-case, for a patent on a human-ape hybrid on the grounds that to grant such a patent would infringe constitutionally granted privacy rights and prohibitions on slavery (Weiss, 2005) . Similarly the Weldon amendment, which became law in 2004, makes it illegal for the USPTO to grant a patent on any 'human organism' including an embryo or fetus (Resnik, 2007) .
The ethics and patentability of hES cells
Human stem cells, whether obtained from embryos, fetal tissue or adult cells, fit into the established paradigm of elements isolated from the human body as the result of technical processes and, as such, do not appear to present problems of patentability in terms of their 'inventedness' and novelty under either EU or US law (Morelli Gradi, 1999; Witek, 2005) . However, specific problems arise with the patentability of hES cells because of the special moral status of the embryo. The human embryo in medicine and biomedical research has long been the subject of heated ethical controversy through the often polarized debates on abortion and assisted reproduction. 5 The special malleability-the toti-or pluripotency-of ES cells has also made them the most desirable type of stem cell for research, potentially offering the greatest chances of achieving the kind of therapeutic breakthroughs which regenerative medicine promises (Gottweiss and Minger, 2008) . This paradox has made it difficult for states wishing to promote a strong biotechnology base to ignore hES cells while simultaneously marking the field as especially fraught political territory to enter. Harvey (2009) has noted that the sensitivity around hES cells has necessitated a level of oversight and regulation above and beyond that which normally applies to other biotechnologies. In particular the necessity of destroying the embryo in order to isolate human ES cells has proved a legal and ethical 'sticking point' in attempts to manage stem cell research. As with other moral aspects of patents on living material, different systems have handled it in different ways.
In keeping with its approach to other biotechnologies, the US approach has been to keep the moral aspects separate from patenting law, opting instead to manage the tension between the value (economic and otherwise) of research on ES cells and the cultural value of protecting the embryo by restricting the provision of federal funding for research on hES cells to existing cell lines, derived from excess embryos resulting from fertility treatment (Hall, 2003) . In this way the state could avoid being seen to sanction, by way of financial support, the contested practice of destroying human embryos whereas at the same time avoiding restrictions on privately funded research on stem cells or the patentability of hES cells. The recent rescinding of the funding restriction under the Obama administration does not, on examination, constitute a genuine cessation of the 'special regulation' of hES work mentioned by Harvey, but rather shifts the site of governance/management from legislation to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) (Connolly, 2009; Taylor, 2009 ). The new NIH draft guidelines allow federal funding for research on more recently created stem cell lines provided that the conditions of their creation meet the ethical criteria for fully informed consent on the part of embryo donors, although whether or not this code will be applied retrospectively to already existing cell lines created under previous ethical standards remains a contentious issue (NIH, 2009; Taylor, 2009 ). Other options, including the derivation of new ES cell lines (as distinct from their use in research), and creating ES-like cells by parthenogenesis or therapeutic cloning remain ineligible for federal funding. Thus the management of scientific, commercial and public interest in hES cells continues, albeit via a different strategic route.
The European Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions (98/44/EU), although implemented before the first reported isolation of human ES cells, already had a provision which dealt with the patentability of human embryos (Plomer, 2006 In this, the absence of any moral exclusion clause of US patent law is an exception. The TRIPS agreement (Article 27) includes a similar morality/ordre public exemption from patentability (Waldby and Salter, 2008) .
Patenting human pluripotent stem cells patentability on the grounds of 'ordre public' or morality whereas Article 6(2), more unusually, contains a non-exhaustive list of specific entities which are excluded from patentability on ethical grounds. The most pertinent of these is Article 6(2)c which excludes from patentability 'uses of human embryos for industrial and commercial purposes' (Plomer, 2006, p. 594) . These provisions are also replicated in the European Patent Convention and, under EU law must also be transposed into national statutory instruments of member states.
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When tested in case law, the European Patent Office has held that the prohibition on patenting the use of human embryos also extends to patents claiming hES cells on the grounds that the derivation of hES cells necessarily involved the destruction of human embryos, constituting an unacceptable 'industrial' use of the embryo (Nielsen and Whittaker, 2002; Barraclough, 2007; Patentanwalts, 2007; Gupte, 2008) . The EPO's decision, originally delivered in the case of a patent applied for by Edinburgh University (EP 0695351) set a precedent in European law which informed the rejection of the WARF patents on primate ES cells (Porter et al., 2006) . The European approach has quite evidently produced a very different, even oppositional, outcome to the US approach, yet neither system has unproblematically resolved all the ethical tensions around hES cell patenting nor remained unchallenged.
Problems with hES cell patenting: from monopolies to moral exemptions
The patents granted to the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation for James Thompson's work on primate (including human) embryonic stem cells are said to be one of the strongest intellectual property holdings in the whole stem cell field (Bergman and Graff, 2007) . The strength of the patents lies in the product claims which cover all primate and human ES cells as compositions of matter, effectively giving WARF 'the legal right to exclude everyone else in the United States from making, using, selling, offering for sale or importing any hES cells covered by the claims until 2015' (Loring and Campbell, 2006, p. 1716) . In this sense the story of the WARF patents is the story of hES cell patenting in the USA, although Geron also have a significant interest 8 (Rabin, 2005) . The strength and breadth of the WARF patents, as well as the initial reluctance of WARF to grant licenses to academic and scientific groups has been criticized as being overly restrictive and of inhibiting valuable basic research by academics and small biotech companies (Loring and Campbell, 2006; Taymor, Scott and Greely, 2006; Nature Biotechnology Editorial, 2007; Plomer et al., 2008) . Particular criticism was levelled at the potentially restrictive effect of the high licence fees-formerly $5000 for academic and public investigators and typically $125 000 for industrial licensees (plus an annual renewal fee of $40 000)-and so-called 'reach through' agreements whereby WARF and Geron are entitled to fees and royalties on any products developed from research on the cell lines, especially in those therapeutic areas already licensed to Geron (Loring and Campbell, 2006; Taymor et al., 2006) .The NIH has since acted to negotiate wider licensing of the hES cell patents to its own researchers and those in the Food and Drug Administration and Centres for Disease Control, as well as to academic centres, through a memorandum of understanding with WARF (Rabin, 2005; Loring and Campbell, 2006) . Critics contend that the arrangement does little to help the financial burden on small and medium biotechnology companies trying to get into this area and is in danger of making the patent holders 'a de facto national utility' for commercial hES cell products (Rabin, 2005, p. 818) . A number of legal challenges to the WARF patent estate have ultimately been unsuccessful as the USPTO has, upon re-examination, upheld the original patent claims, having the opposite-than-intended effect of strengthening the patent holder's position (Plomer et al., 2008; Vrtovec and Scott, 2008) . The EPO ruling on the unpatentability of hES cells appears, at first, to raise an insurmountable barrier to the viability of future commercial work in this area. However, the authority of EU law to insist upon the specific exemptions from patentability listed in Directive [Article 6(2)] and EPC (Rule 28) depends on these examples being adjudged to derive from 'moral norms' common to European culture 9 (Plomer, 2006) . In regard to other exceptions on the basis of morality the EU is 'obliged to respect the national identities of its member states' (Plomer, 2006, p. 596) This type of ethical (re)positioning can be viewed as part of an ongoing technical and rhetorical debate on the differentiating and reproductive capacity of human stem cells (Hauskeller, 2005) . A distinction between totipotent and pluripotent cells has become mapped onto the wider European debate on patentability with totipotency being associated with the EPO vision of the embryo as unpatentable, natural entity, whereas pluripotency evokes the existing rule allowing patentability of biological components isolated from nature Geron's involvement with Thompson's original work entitles them to exclusive commercial licenses on his method of deriving hES cells, three differentiated cell lines derived from the hES cells and the rights to develop therapeutic applications from them (Rabin, 2005) . Other examples of technologies excluded from patentability on moral grounds include human reproductive cloning and human germ line gene therapy (Salter, 2007) .
(considering hES cells in culture as isolated and distinct from cells in an embryo per se). This distinction has been used by researchers in restrictive states such as Germany to justify importing foreign-created stem cell lines for research and offers scope for European researchers to patent hES cells and derived inventions by avoiding the EPO and applying for patents from national patent offices of countries amenable to hESC research. It would not, however, necessarily prevent the granting of potentially restrictive and monopolistic patents on hES cells as broadly defined compositions of matter. In any case, Porter et al. (2006) note that relatively few companies have made use of the UK Intellectual Property Office (IPO) stance in this way; one possible reason being that any hES cell patent granted by the UK IPO might still be subject to further guidance and possibly challenge through the national courts.
New technologies and new challenges for patent law
Since the 2003 decision by the UK IPO, a number of new technological options have appeared which threaten the tenuous totipotent/ pluripotent distinction and at the same time offer new promise for renegotiating the landscape of hES cell patenting. Recent developments in the field of cell biology have raised the possibility of generating pluripotent embryonic-like stem cells by means other than Thompson's method of isolating primate ES cells (Taymor et al., 2006) . These include the derivation of 'ES-like' cells from arrested, non-viable embryos (Zhang et al., 2006) and potential access to hES cells without the destruction of the embryo through the techniques applied in isolating single cells from the blastomere during preimplantation genetic diagnosis (Klimanskaya et al., 2006) . Human multipotent material has also been created through fusing somatic and embryonic cells (Cowan et al., 2005) . Other new techniques do not involve embryonic sources at all. Pluripotent human cells have been extracted from cord blood (Zhao et al., 2006) and human amniotic fluid (De Coppi et al., 2007) . Perhaps the most headline-grabbing development has been the production of 'induced' pluripotent cells through the reprogramming or 'dedifferentiation' of human somatic cells (Takahashi, et al., 2007; Wernig et al., 2007; Yu et al., 2007) . The importance of all these developments for this discussion is that they offer potential challenges to the current definition of embryonic cells and their derivatives in patent law. With regards to hES cells, this is given added potential by the fact that there is no internationally accepted definition of what precisely constitutes a human embryo (Taymor et al., 2006) . The claims made in James Thompson's original patents do not attempt to define the term, rather describing the derived hES cell lines in terms of four key characteristics: ability to proliferate in vitro for over 1 year, maintaining a stable karyotype, potential to differentiate into germ layers, and inhibition from differentiation when cultured on fibroblast feeder layers (Taymor et al., 2006) . Embryo-like cells created by reprogramming of somatic cells, cell fusion or extraction from cord blood or amniotic fluid could be recognized as being legally and technically distinct from stem cells created from human embryos by the Thompson method by focusing on the definition(s) of cell pluripotency through particular cell surface markers and other biological components.
This approach offers a way to overcome the tendency of broad product claims to homogenize technological areas and to contain increasingly abstract concepts (i.e. extrapolating from marmoset and rhesus monkey ES cells to all pluripotent cells or pluripotency itself) (Radder, 2004; Oldham and Cutter, 2006) . Although these innovations are still very much at an experimental stage and are not guaranteed to lead to clinical or commercial applications, they do potentially represent a way to circumvent both the remit of the WARF patent estate and the EU biotechnology directive Article 6(2) (Rabin, 2005; Vrtovec and Scott, 2008) . Breaking up the monopoly on pluripotency given to hES cells would have the effect in intellectual property terms of bypassing the otherwise compulsory entry point into this area of research that the WARF patent estate represents. Similarly the EPO ruling on the unpatentability of human embryonic material could not reasonably be extended to induced pluripotent stem (iPS) cells, or to those methods of obtaining hES cells that do not require destruction of a viable embryo. Although unlikely to usurp the importance of human ES cells in basic research (at least in the medium term) these new technical options do offer the possibility of inventing around the restrictions on human embryonic material, especially if it is possible to apply knowledge gleaned from the study of hES cells to iPS and other cells and vice versa. Accordingly, Vrtovec and Scott (2008) anticipate that the definition of pluripotency in patent law could become a new battle-ground in patenting disputes between stem cell researchers and companies.
In order for this to work then, sufficient stringency needs to be applied in the interpretations of the claims made in patent applications to ensure the remit is proportional to the discoveries actually made and does not extend beyond what is achievable under the methods and techniques disclosed in the patent itself. This approach has recently been given a boost by the USPTO decision not to award WARF an extension of its existing patent claims to include iPS cells (Vrtovec and Scott, 2008) . However, Bergman and Graff (2007) warn that a proliferation of patents in stem cell biology held by multiple different owners could ultimately provide a more significant obstacle to research and innovation than monopolistic patents like the WARF estate. Noting the steadily increasing number of patent applications in the field of stem cell science since the 1990s they warn that a potential 'patent thicket' or anti-commons may arise in which:
[T]he existence of many overlapping patent claims can cause uncertainty about freedom to operate, impose multiple layers of transaction costs and stack royalty payments beyond levels that can be supported by the value of single innovations (Bergman and Graff, 2007, p. 419) .
Following this argument, creating new patent holdings on pluripotency might only create a plurality of compulsory entry points into non-adult stem cell research which, in the worst case scenario, overlap in their claims making it even more difficult for academic researchers and small start-up companies to get freedom to operate. In the same article the authors go on to argue that changes in patent law take too long to come into effect and require time-consuming, laborious bureaucratic action to implement. Instead they favour other legal and institutional solutions to this (potential) problem through actions such as compulsory licensing or other options like the creation of patent pools.
Patenting human pluripotent stem cells
Redressing the balance in hES cell patents? Cornish et al. (2003) remind us that the purpose of IPRs is to regulate what may and may not be patented (both in terms of subject matter and the statement of claims), not to control how patented knowledge is used. From this perspective, finding an ethical balance in the application of IPRs to hES cells requires consideration of both the interpretation of patent law in regards to claims over key areas, such as the definition of embryonic material and pluripotency, and the external environment of stem cell research in which such patents must operate. The potential disruption to ongoing ES cell research due to the retrospective nature of the new NIH guidelines on informed consent illustrate that the institutional and systemic governance of stem cell research requires deft handling as much as the oft-highlighted ethical issues about IPR's in such material. Following Bergman and Graff's (2007) recommendations, compulsory licensing could overcome some issues of access to patented discoveries in basic stem cell research. Such laws are, however, deeply unpopular with the pharmaceutical industry and recent amendments to the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement make it clear that the provision is primarily intended to allow developing countries to respond to public health emergencies (Cornish et al., 2003) . Similarly, competition law generally requires evidence of malpractice, rather than simply exploitation of a strong patent platform, before any legal intervention can be sanctioned.
Other, collaborative, options such as patent pools and IP clearinghouses for embryonic and other stem cell patents may be more viable (Ebersole et al., 2005; Aoki and Schiff, 2008) . Similar options have been proposed, and in some cases implemented, for other areas of biotechnology such as genetics/genomics, e.g. the Single Nucleotide Polymorphism Consortium, the case of expressed sequence tags (Cornish et al., 2003; Rai and Eisenberg, 2003) . Collaborative approaches are particularly pertinent in emerging and developing research fields where 'upstream' patents on basic biological processes can have a significant effect on the freedom to operate. The field of stem cell research is already distinct from many other areas of research in that public sector organizations hold a significant share of the intellectual property, 10 and there has been a proliferation of not-for-profit organizations supporting the scientific development of the field from the UK Stem Cell Bank to the International Society for Stem Cell Research. This suggests that the special character of stem cells and hES cells in particular and the need for correspondingly specific and innovative methods of supporting the field have already been recognized. Similarly, large pharmaceutical manufacturers have only recently begun to offer notable financial support to stem cell research (and the wider field of regenerative medicine) and much support for research in this area has come from non-traditional sources such as the grants provided by the California Institute for Regenerative Medicine. Harvey (2009) has suggested that, in light of the difficulties with the contemporary patent situation and the extra ethical sensitivity of human ES cells, 'the biotech innovation model ignores the specificities of hESC development' and as such may not at present be the best approach to realize successful stem cell therapies. A move away from the standard commercial model and the very robust approach to biotechnology patents employed by the USPTO may seem unlikely, but the present financial climate has demonstrated the limitations of the existing biotech model of innovation as the supply of speculative venture capital dries up, especially in Europe (Archer, 2009; Mitchel, 2009; Rowley and Martin, 2009 ). It may be that for stem cell research to flourish patent assignees need to act more like stakeholders in a cumulative process rather than direct competitors. This is not to suggest that cell therapy cannot be a successful commercial enterprise, but it is worth remembering that as other areas of the biotechnology industry, such as genomics, have matured the sources of value in company business models and in IP holdings tend to re-orientate 'downstream', moving away from basic processes and nearer product development (Rothman and Kraft, 2006) . It may be that collaboration in the immediate term is necessary to allow the field to develop sufficiently to form the technological basis for a future competitive stem cell industry. Barude et al. (2005) have also articulated concern that stem cell medicine still needs to be protected from premature commercial exploitation which may be ultimately detrimental to the field. The pursuit of an ethical balance in patent law regarding hES cells needs to keep pace with the technological developments in research but also to take into consideration the wider organizational, especially public/private context and the fact the stem cell research is a unique and emergent field where knowledge, configured as intellectual property or otherwise, is crucial not only to the development of commercial enterprises but also to the scientific endeavour itself.
Conclusion
This article addresses the issue of the ethics of patenting in hES cells by considering hES cells in the wider context of biotechnology. The importance of IPRs for commercial development and the associated ethical concerns about patents on biological, especially living, material are common to both hES cells and other biotechnology sectors such as genomics and genetically modified organisms. However, hES cells also raise unique issues because of their special nature. Specific ethical concerns arise because of the privileged moral and cultural status of the human embryo and the desire to avoid its destruction. At the same time hES cells have unique potential to facilitate understanding of the cellular mechanisms of differentiation and are one of the most promising areas of regenerative medicine. It is these distinctive properties, where hES cells diverge from other biotechnologies often requiring additional regulation and management, that make a case for hES cells to receive special consideration in patent law.
An ethical patent law must seek to find a balance between rewarding (and promoting) innovation and preserving other public goods including the freedom of academic research. In the case of hES cell patenting such a balance would appear to lie between the outright ban on property rights in hES cells currently advocated by the EPO and the potential monopolistic patent estates allowed by the USPTO's broad interpretation of hES patent claims. Although attempting to resolve such a complex and multi-faceted issue is beyond the scope of this artilce, we give consideration to the potential of recent technological developments in cell pluripotency and the insights they offer for an alternative approach to patenting in this field. Induced pluripotent cells and other sources of embryonic or ES-like cells can open up pluripotency as a subject of patenting beyond those existing claims on embryonic stem cells. Recognition of these scientific developments can thus potentially break the link between embryonic stem cells, whose derivation currently necessitates the destruction of human embryos, and patent claims on pluripotent human cells per se. There is considerable precedent for adaptation in the way patent systems have previously been altered to accommodate other then-innovative technologies such as organic chemistry, microbiology and prior biotechnological innovations, including a 2001 move by the USPTO to apply stricter criteria to the patenting of genes and gene fragments (Cornish et al., 2003) . This approach offers a way to negotiate some of the moral and legal obstacles to a more ethical, balanced patent law for hES cells.
Such an approach requires changes within patent law, such as greater proportionality in interpreting the scope of claims made in patent applications, but also recognizes that patent law alone cannot determine how patented knowledge is used. We argue that to facilitate the development of the still-emergent field of stem cell research greater emphasis be given to collaborative approaches such as patent pools and other devices to share existing knowledge on hES and other pluripotent cells. Equally, in light of the difficulties with the contemporary patent situation and the extra ethical sensitivity of human ES cells, we note that the current biotech innovation model we described ignores the specificities of hESC development and as such may not at present be the best approach to realize successful stem cell therapies.
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